Revisiting the Navy’s Moral Compass: Has Commanding Officer Conduct Improved? by Vogt, Jason A., Captain
Naval War College Review
Volume 68
Number 2 Spring Article 7
2015
Revisiting the Navy’s Moral Compass: Has
Commanding Officer Conduct Improved?
Jason A. Vogt Captain
U.S. Navy
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vogt, Jason A. Captain (2015) "Revisiting the Navy’s Moral Compass: Has Commanding Officer Conduct Improved?," Naval War
College Review: Vol. 68 : No. 2 , Article 7.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/7
 The U�S� Navy continues to suffer from poor decision making among a small number of commanding officers (COs), as demonstrated by continued 
headlines: “Squadron Commander Relieved of Duty after Alleged Drunk Driving 
Incident”;1 “Amphib [amphibious force] CO Fired, Source Says Linked to Alleged 
Bribery Scheme”;2 “Sub Commander Relieved of Duty after Woman Alleges He 
Faked Death to End Affair”;3 “Navy Investigates ex–Blue Angels Commander 
after Complaint He Allowed Sexual Harassment”;4 and “Navy Skipper Abdicated 
Command�”5 Since the publication in these pages in 2012 of Captain Mark F� 
Light’s “The Navy’s Moral Compass,” individual cases of Navy commanding 
officers making poor decisions of such kinds have continued to trouble Navy 
leadership�6 Considering that more than 2,350 Navy billets are designated as 
command positions, the infrequency of such events reflects the dedication of 
most commanding officers�7 In fact, as Vice Admiral Thomas Copeman, address-
ing the specifics of a misconduct event as Commander, Naval Surface Force, U�S� 
Pacific Fleet, wrote in 2014, “In my experience [the 
violations] are beyond rare; they are � � � wholly un-
representative of the supremely talented men and 
women filling positions of leadership�”8 
While it involves overall a statistically low per-
centage of commanding officers, continued misbe-
havior reinforces Captain Light’s assessment that 
it is a potential integrity issue for the Navy� In the 
three years since the original article, substantial 
debate has occurred, and corrective actions have 
been taken by the Navy� Is it enough? Is it even 
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REVISITING THE NAVY’S MORAL COMPASS
moving in the right direction? This article reviews Captain Light’s findings and 
updates his analysis with subsequent data; explains and assesses actions taken by 
Navy leadership since 2011 to improve the quality of commanding officers; and 
explores additional variables in today’s debate on commanding officer behavior� 
Finally, the article presents recommendations to reduce future personal indiscre-
tions by commanding officers�
THE MORAL COMPASS AND INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT 2010
 “The Navy’s Moral Compass” reviewed and analyzed data provided by the Career 
Progression Division of the Naval Personnel Command (NPC) on CO “detach-
ments for cause” (DFCs) from 1999 through 2010�9 These data sorted firings 
into two broad categories (as resulting from professional or personal-conduct 
reasons), then broke down the latter by community (air, surface, submarine, 
etc�), rank, and duty type� Captain Light academically analyzed that material and 
concluded that the Navy had to accomplish three tasks to elevate the quality of 
the commanding officer corps and the character of naval leadership�10 
First, Navy leadership had to establish a sense of urgency, not just to deal with 
issues quickly (and publicly, to maintain transparency), but also to effect change 
that would preclude unscrupulous actions in the first place� Second, he argued, 
the Navy needed to set an ethical and moral standard (preferably in writing, as 
the Army did in Army: Profession of Arms and the Army Operating Concept of 
2010) to help create a shift in the Navy mind-set and culture as a whole�11 Finally, 
the Navy had to improve the metrics, specifically the documentation, in periodic 
evaluations under the Bureau of Personnel’s Fitness Report and Counseling Rec-
ord, of potential moral shortcomings� Captain Light concluded with three rec-
ommendations, first that Navy leadership elevate the priority of ethical behavior, 
establishing a central database of reliefs of COs owing to personal or professional 
failures to facilitate tracking and analysis� Additionally, he urged them to under-
take a campaign to set standards of integrity and honorable behavior� Lastly, he 
argued, the officer fitness report ought to be modified in format and concept to 
address character and integrity specifically�12
Concurrently with the original publication of “The Navy’s Moral Compass,” 
the Navy Inspector General (IG) released a study on reliefs of commanding offi-
cers for cause�13 Focusing on firings between 1 January 2005 and 30 June 2010, the 
report determined the Navy’s overall commanding officer DFC firing rate to be 
low—approximately 1 percent per year, with a small variance from year to year� It 
saw no correlation between CO DFCs and career paths, personality traits, acces-
sion sources, time in command, or year groups; however, it noted a preponder-
ance of Navy-wide CO reliefs for personal misconduct�14 In personal misconduct 
instances, it appears, fired COs either lacked the insight into their own motives 
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and weaknesses that might have prevented unacceptable behavior or felt they 
had the power to conceal the misconduct (the “Bathsheba Syndrome”)�15 Fur-
thermore, the study had found that implementation of four recommendations of 
a 2004 Navy Inspector General DFC study had had no discernible impact on the 
DFC rate (though the recommendations themselves were valid and represented 
a solid foundation for long-term reduction)�16 The 2010 report concluded with 
three further recommendations� The first was to establish an officer leadership 
training continuum from accession through major command, a continuum un-
der a single “owner,” to provide consistency in curriculum development and exe-
cution� Second, improved oversight by immediate superiors in command (ISICs) 
would better identify potential or ongoing issues earlier� Third, it recommended 
that the Navy enforce existing requirements for Command Climate Assessments 
and their executive summaries�17 
ACTIONS AND REACTIONS
Whether in response to the two 2010 publications or, as a matter of coincidence, 
to continued (and sometimes very public) CO failures, Navy leadership began 
taking steps in early 2011 to address the trend� Admiral John C� Harvey, Jr�, Com-
mander, Fleet Forces Command, recognized that the majority of detachments for 
cause of COs during his tenure had been for personal misconduct, a fact that he 
confronted in a memorandum to his subordinates and through his official Navy 
blog�18 This public acknowledgment was the first of several initiatives by senior 
Navy officials to instill more honor and integrity in the position of commanding 
officer�
The “Charge of Command”
By June 2011 Admiral Gary Roughead, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
distributed a “Charge of Command”—a memorandum notifying current and 
prospective commanding officers of his expectation that each of them would 
meet the highest standards of personal and professional conduct while in com-
mand�19 Roughead’s memo addressed three essential principles he, as CNO, 
considered to constitute the heart and soul of command: authority, responsibility, 
and accountability� His document tied these principles both to the tradition of 
naval command and to Title 10 of the U�S� Code, which speaks to the standards 
of conduct by individuals in command�20 His successor, Admiral Jonathan W� 
Greenert, reissued and reinforced the Charge of Command, requiring serving 
and prospective commanding officers not only to review the memorandum but 
to sign it with their immediate superiors as a compact between Navy leadership 
and Navy commanders and commanding officers�21 This step created not only a 
counseling opportunity and mentoring tool but also a contract between the Navy 
and its commanding officers regarding personal conduct� 
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The Command Qualification Program
Admiral Greenert further codified the process of setting standards and identify-
ing future commanding officers by introducing a Command Qualification Pro-
gram�22 Released in June 2012 with an implementation deadline of 1 September 
2012, the governing instruction plainly set out policy, procedures, and basic, 
minimum standards for the qualifying and screening of naval officers for com-
mand� Until then individual communities had determined for themselves how to 
go about selecting their future commanding officers� This autonomy had resulted 
in sometimes widely varying criteria� Now, for the first time, the Navy applied 
minimum standards across all officer “designators” (e�g�, unrestricted line, Supply 
Corps) and required, among other things, that potential commanding officers 
be screened by an administrative board� In support of the Command Qualifica-
tion Program, the Command Leadership School’s Command Course, required 
for prospective commanding officers, instituted a written test covering tenets of 
leadership, duties and responsibilities of commanding officers, and authorities as 
laid down in U�S� Navy Regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice�23 
Admiral Greenert further approved a Navy Leader Development Strategy, to 
promote leader character development, emphasize ethics, and reinforce the ser-
vice’s “core values�” The strategy called for a career-long continuum to develop 
leaders and for a focus on character development to help young officers prepare 
for command�24 The strategy led to the evolution of the Command Leadership 
School into the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center (NLEC)�25 Aligned with the 
Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, NLEC now develops curriculum 
and performs assessment to instill the tenets of ethical leadership throughout the 
Navy; to develop and guide leaders with a strong sense of responsibility, author-
ity, and accountability; and to impart commitment to the Navy’s core values and 
ethos to sailors�26 Vice Admiral Walter E� “Ted” Carter, Jr�, now superintendent 
of the U�S� Naval Academy but at the time a rear admiral and President of the 
Naval War College, described the establishment of NLEC as “an opportunity 
to take a more proactive approach in improving a culture of character develop-
ment in conjunction with continued command leader education” with a goal of 
“improved leader development�”27 With a consistent qualification program and a 
focus at NLEC on ethical and character expectations, clear standards and expec-
tations are now set for current and future commanding officers�
Command Climate Assessments
Recent events have brought renewed rigor to the Defense and Navy Departments’ 
Equal Opportunity programs, specifically regarding race, gender, and sexual 
orientation and addressing issues ranging from hazing to harassment, assault, 
and fraternization� One measure of the program’s effectiveness is the Command 
Climate Assessment, a survey that should occur within ninety days after a new 
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CO assumes command, with annual follow-up assessments during the command 
tour�28 The Navy’s use of the Command Climate Assessment to support its equal 
opportunity program goes back many years, with little change in responsibilities 
defined for the ISIC and commanding officer�29 Unfortunately, over the years 
many commands did not fully execute the program, typically using the results 
largely for “internal consumption” and not making a priority to forward results 
to ISICs� This resulted in inconsistent application of lessons learned� Two devel-
opments have refocused the Equal Opportunity program and renewed interest 
in the Command Climate Assessment: the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and 
increased scrutiny on the military’s Sexual Assault Prevention & Response pro-
gram� These issues have made the Command Climate Assessment a useful tool 
both within the unit and as a measure of that unit up the chain of command� 
While the Command Climate Assessment cannot alone identify CO wrong-
doing or personal misconduct, it can warn the ISIC to pay close attention to 
individual commanding officers who may need assistance, guidance, or stricter 
oversight� Such thoroughness by the ISIC would match the 2010 Navy Inspector 
General’s recommendation that existing requirements for Command Climate 
Assessments be enforced�30 Unfortunately, for a period after publication of the 
report there were no assessments at all; contractual issues with the company 
responsible for maintaining the servers involved prevented surveys for approxi-
mately six months in late 2012 and early 2013�31 With the resumption of surveys 
has come renewed Navy leadership emphasis: commands now must use a “tri-
angulation” method, utilizing multiple sources of information (e�g�, the surveys 
themselves, records reviews, and focus groups, interviews, and observations by 
command assessment teams)�32 Renewed emphasis on ISIC involvement, to in-
clude follow-up reports on actions taken in response to assessments, should make 
the Command Climate Assessment a more useful tool in the future�
Reactions and Response
A consequence of the increasing importance of social media and “viral” networks 
is nearly immediate discussion of changes or potential changes in the way busi-
ness is conducted� This was the case with the Charge of Command; feedback 
varied from strong support to outright aversion� The Association of the United 
States Navy was quick to announce support: “Admiral Gary Roughead’s legacy to 
the nation will be an inspiration to the officers and leaders that will follow him�”33 
Some blogs condemned the document, one calling the Charge of Command 
“a pathetic response to the real problem we have with COs being fired� Only a 
fonctionaire [sic] thinks that a bit of paper can substitute for solid leadership and 
a culture of honor and integrity—but that is the decision that has been made�”34 
Military-interest publications such as Navy Times were quick to note each step to 
improve leadership, with requisite editorial comment� Meanwhile, each CO firing 
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has continued to be a “front page” headline� Websites like SailorBob�com, a U�S� 
Naval Institute–sponsored professional forum for Surface Warfare Officers, now 
offer informal environments where members can discuss and argue about the 
directions taken by Navy leadership, debate the conclusions of various studies, 
and dissect each firing event�35 In this and other, similar forums hosted by naval 
warfare communities, virtual peer pressure offers an additional deterrent to mis-
conduct while individual events and issues are deliberated� However, debate and 
opinion pieces do not sufficiently measure success� Continued analysis of com-
manding officer firings will be necessary to determine whether the adjustments 
that have been made are meaningful�
2011–2013 DATA AND TREND ANALYSIS
The intention for this article was to update Captain Light’s data directly, by re-
questing DFC data for 2011 through 2013 from the source he used, the Career 
Progression Division of the Naval Personnel Command� However, owing to 
ongoing official investigations and the ever-increasing scrutiny of CO firings, 
the data were not forthcoming� But comparable statistics can be collected from 
other sources, including the Freedom of Information Act� Moreover, as the topic 
of COs being removed from command has high visibility, firing events have been 
documented by not only Navy Times but numerous websites, chat rooms, and 
blogs�36 
However, because not all firings result in formal detachments for cause, these 
data would be likely to identify more firings than are officially documented by 
the Navy, to which Captain Light’s work confined itself�37 It being understood 
that this difference in data sources leaves room for challenge, this research at-
tempted to maintain consistency by retaining previously determined definitions 
and by considering all firings as potential DFCs� A list of fired commanding 
officers published by Navy Times, the most public data for 2011–13, was used 
as the baseline�38 A known disparity exists in data sets (for example, Navy Times 
reports seventeen firings for 2010, NPC three), but to lessen its impact the analy-
sis focused less on statistical specifics than on apparent trends potentially linked 
to Navy actions�39 
Figure 1 presents the total number of firings from 2010 through 2013� Firings 
occurring in 2010 were addressed in Captain Light’s article; the 2010 data are 
provided here only as a starting point� This analysis focuses on firings occurring 
after the publication of the Charge of Command� 
Using the definition of personal misconduct in the 2010 Inspector General 
report and previously established categories, removals were sorted by cause as 
“personal,” “professional,” or “unknown�”40 To make more specific the general ca-
veats noted above, when NPC officially determines whether each removal in this 
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data set is a detachment 
for cause, several, those 
not found to be DFCs, 
may be removed� Ad-
ditionally,  when al l 
now-pending Freedom 
of  Information Act 
requests are resolved, 
a number will likely 
move from “unknown” 
to another category� 
Figure 2 breaks down 
firings for personal, 
professional, and un-
known (or unpublished) reasons� It can be seen that the number of “unknowns” 
has increased in recent years� This is the result of a lack of detail provided in 
reasons for firing, often simply “loss of confidence [i�e�, on the part of a superior] 
in ability to command�” It might be assumed that many firings categorized as 
“unknown” for lack of published circumstances were actually for professional 
reasons, for which the “sensational” personal failings that might produce detailed 
media accounts would be absent� However, for this analysis, cases without those 
details remain “unknown�” 
Concentrating only on the firings for reasons identified as personal, the data 
trend downward from a high of thirteen in 2010 to only five in 2013� Six of the 
twelve firings during 2011 occurred after Admiral Roughead’s Charge of Com-
mand memorandum was published� Three of the six firings occurred within a 
month of publication, leaving room for debate whether offending actions had 
occurred before the 
Charge of Command 
was circulated� Break-
ing the data down by 
community (figure 3) 
does not reveal any 
trends or patterns, pre-
sumably because of the 
decreasing number of 
cases� As both Captain 
Light and the IG report 
found, no trends or 
patterns are apparent 
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in occurrences after 
the Charge of Com-
mand with respect to 
rank of the individual 
or whether an opera-
tional (at-sea) or shore 
command is involved� 
In every case involving 
personal failings, the 
transgression (miscon-
duct, inappropriate be-
havior, alcohol-related 
i nc i d e nt ,  e tc � )  w as 
independent of profes-
sional requirements� 
Given the shrinking 
data set, therefore, it is 
necessary to investigate 
beyond community groups and explore individual cases for trends and linkages�
Since the Navy initiated steps to improve commanding officer accountability, 
the trend lines have appeared favorable in terms of the goal of reducing firings 
for personal misconduct� Though only a few years into the enterprise, the result 
is indicative of the effectiveness of giving prospective commanding officers the 
message regarding expectations of them while in command� Nevertheless, more 
than thirty Navy COs have been fired for personal misconduct since the Charge 
of Command was implemented� Why? This is a small number, considering the 
number of commands and commanding officers in the Navy, but the reasons why 
some individuals still do not “get it” merit further scrutiny� 
Previous reports asserted that organizational culture plays no role in CO mis-
conduct�41 Both the 2004 and 2010 Inspector General reports found no discern-
ible correlations between career paths, personality traits, accession sources, time 
in command, or year groups (i�e�, year of commissioning)�42 However, in contrast 
to the shrinking overall number of firings per year and generally even distribu-
tion of firings across communities, one peak in recent data is worth noting as 
an outlier—the aviation electronic-warfare community, comprising Electronic 
Attack (VAQ) and Fleet Air Reconnaissance (VQ) squadrons� The VAQ and VQ 
subcommunities account for approximately 10 percent of the Navy’s aviation 
squadrons�43 Since implementation of the Charge of Command this subculture 
has been responsible for half the aviation COs fired for misconduct (five of ten), 
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17 percent of all misconduct CO reliefs between 2011 and 2013, and the first 
Navy CO fired for misconduct in 2014�44 
This anomaly could exist for any number of reasons� Given the relatively short 
time and small numbers involved Navy-wide, it may simply be an unfortunate 
coincidence� Or there may be a cultural divergence that either was not present or 
went unrecognized during previous studies, some tendency that has developed 
out of the culture, training, and ethos of a group that is stationed, when not de-
ployed, at one location (the Navy’s VAQ subcommunity and the VQ squadron 
where a firing occurred during the period reviewed are both based at Naval Air 
Station Whidbey Island, in Washington)� Or possibly this is a niche that simply 
has not had enough time pass to absorb the new standards for commanding of-
ficers into its system� On the basis of standard patterns of rotations and promo-
tions, the department heads who in 2011 witnessed their commanding officers 
signing (among the first to do so) the Charge of Command have not yet returned 
to be COs themselves� To know absolutely that every year group of every com-
munity understands and executes the Charge of Command may take between 
four and seven years—a period the Navy is just now entering� 
An instance that more obviously counters previous reports that organizational 
culture plays no role is that of the Blue Angels� Although the officer recently 
investigated for misconduct had already completed his tour in the squadron 
and was in a subsequent noncommand billet when his reassignment occurred, 
the causal events, described as his promoting a hostile work environment and 
tolerating sexual harassment, had occurred during his tenure as CO�45 The in-
vestigation determined that while the CO was responsible, the organizational 
culture had devolved into something from a bygone era� Pornography, lewd 
comments, and raunchy pranks were widely condoned and tolerated, just “boys 
being boys,” all under the direct observation of the commanding officer�46 The 
inquiry resulted in not only the firing of the CO but a restructuring of the Blue 
Angels organization�47 
Nevertheless, neither organizational culture nor rationalization by individual 
members can excuse actions that are clearly and plainly labeled inappropriate by 
the Navy� With the implementation of the Charge of Command, misconduct by 
a commanding officer comes down to a conscious decision� None of those fired 
were in any doubt about what was right and wrong, not only in terms of Navy reg-
ulations but also, in the vast majority of cases, according to law, a moral code, or 
both� Mechanisms are in place—training for prospective COs by the Naval Lead-
ership and Ethics Center, the Command Qualification Program, the Charge of 
Command, clear statements of the expectations for commanding officers and their 
immediate superiors, and routine and standard Command Climate Assessments 
—to minimize commanding officer misconduct� But more can be done�
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A TRUE, LONG-TERM, AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION
To have no commanding officers relieved for cause would not be an achievable 
goal; professional mishaps will occur that warrant holding a CO accountable� 
But it is not unrealistic to strive to eliminate reliefs due to misconduct or indi-
vidual ethical failure� The positive actions described here are good first steps� But 
consistent enforcement of these topics and follow-up initiatives are necessary to 
avoid a long-term appearance that the Navy’s response was simply reactive, a 
“Band-Aid,” not a true, long-term, and sustainable solution� To continue to build 
on the gains already achieved, the following recommendations are offered�
Be Transparent and Consistent, Navy
When the Navy attempts to move forward, it often proves its own worst enemy� 
Two consecutive CNOs have placed the integrity of commanding officers high 
on their priority lists and set standards of performance� Yet the public assump-
tion is that “Big Navy” has something to hide—because commanding officers are 
relieved without official statement about whether the reasons were professional 
or personal� The ubiquitous “loss of confidence” leaves much to the imagination, 
particularly in a social-media and blog environment where the allegation of hid-
ing details results in overall loss of confidence in the broader establishment� This 
lack of transparency is compounded each time a firing is not publicly acknowl-
edged or officially tracked because it did not fit an administrative criterion (i�e�, 
the financial parameters of a formal detachment for cause)� 
The 2010 Inspector General report acknowledged several cases of command-
ing officers relieved early that it could have considered but did not because the 
DFC process had not been initiated�48 The IG investigation had no reliable way 
to determine how often COs had been detached early but quietly, as if their tours 
had been successful, when a DFC might have been more appropriate�49 Most 
conspicuously, in 2003 when a reported twenty-six commanding officers were 
relieved, only seven were listed by the Naval Personnel Command as DFCs�50 
The combination of potentially inconsistent Navy data with Navy Personnel 
Command unwillingness to release a comprehensive list makes evident a lack of 
transparency concerning CO misconduct� 
The way to rise above what does or does not constitute a DFC is to call it what 
it is—a firing is a firing� Restricting official concern to reliefs that cost the Navy 
money will, in the long run, erode trust in the service and bring its integrity 
into question� The removal of commanding officers prior to projected rotation 
dates should be addressed by ISICs whether they occur for operational reasons 
or not�51 If a “no-cost DFC” category is created, future studies will have a more 
comprehensive data set to analyze� The importance of dealing with all command-
ing officer firings was addressed in the 2004 IG report, though not in 2010� Such 
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a complete listing might challenge the analysis of this article, but thereafter there 
would be a consistent basis for future analysis, discussion, and debate�
Compounding the appearance of a lack of transparency was the Navy’s accep-
tance of the unavailability of Command Assessments for six months� Contractual 
and budget issues were allowed to disable a leadership tool� The 2010 Inspector 
General’s report had stated, “Command climate assessments would be a better 
tool for commands if there was a broader understanding throughout the fleet” of 
what assessments were and how to use them;52 not using them at all depreciated 
them in the eyes of the fleet� Additionally, the IG had found that in almost all 
the CO detachments for cause correct use of the assessments, especially accurate 
executive summaries, would have highlighted early for ISICs the behavior and 
command-climate problems�53 To have been denied the assessment process so 
soon after it had been identified as necessary was a mixed signal�
Progress toward transparency would also be achieved by a more thorough 
tracking system� In an age where baseball sabermetrics can track the actual (and 
even predict potential) performance of individual players in specific situations, 
the Navy ought to be able to track more closely the development of potential 
commanding officers and performance of current ones� Correlating data not 
only of firings but also leading to and during command tours—such as who had 
worked for whom over the years and what had been said by and about individuals 
in “360-degree” evaluations—might uncover linkages or trends not yet consid-
ered� No record now follows how subordinates of COs relieved for misconduct 
fare in future positions or suggests whether there is any correlation to their own 
future misconduct� While developing such a capability would be a herculean 
task, it would be within the mission of the Navy’s Human Resources community, 
specifically its Core Competencies of management and development�54 Until such 
analysis is established and employed, public speculation, suspicion, and scrutiny 
will continue�
Reexamine the Data
The Inspector General reports completed in 2004 and 2010 each took an objec-
tive look at the DFC process and came up with recommendations to address fu-
ture commanding officer failings� For the reasons explained above, however, the 
picture the reports presented was incomplete� While it provided enough clarity 
for the CNO to determine that the Charge of Command, Command Qualifica-
tion Program, and Command Climate Assessments were necessary, incomplete-
ness of data may have the Navy chasing symptoms rather than a cure� It is time for 
another official Navy review of not just the DFC process but any and all removals 
of COs prior to their original rotation dates� A harder look at COs will produce 
a more complete understanding of the effectiveness of current and future initia-
tives to eliminate personal misconduct that results in firings�
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Establish and Enforce Dissuasive (Monetary) Measures 
Despite any amount of training, formal setting of personal and professional ex-
pectations, or examples of colleagues who are relieved for their own misconduct, 
the risks may not be high enough to deter those on the edge� When a command-
ing officer is relieved for individual failures, the topic quickly appears in articles, 
comment sections of periodicals, blogs, and chat rooms� In almost every case 
someone offers a variation on the statement “Commander X may no longer be 
the commanding officer, but he will still get to retire with his twenty years, receive 
his full pension, get a lucrative position outside the Navy, and other than some 
fleeting embarrassment he will receive no real punishment�” 
Command is the pinnacle of the military profession, and it is not a part-time 
job� It is not conducted only during business hours� As Admiral Roughead once 
said, commanders are duty bound to uphold strict behavioral standards, even 
when off duty�55 Whether a commanding officer’s misconduct is deliberate (driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol, bribery, fraternization, etc�) or results from 
failure to fulfill duties assigned or abdication of them (as occurred twice recently, 
with the Blue Angels and the guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens), the com-
manding officer remains responsible�56 As in other professions, a leader must 
be held accountable when performance results in failure� In most professions 
failure often results in removal of professional position and credentials, pecuni-
ary penalties, or both� Doctors who do not perform adequately risk the loss of 
their licenses and punitive judgments for malpractice� Lawyers can be disbarred 
or sanctioned for demonstrated inability� Even midshipmen are held accountable 
for failure once midway through their training; they owe time in service or, if 
they cannot complete their training, must reimburse the Navy for the education 
received�57 So what is the cost of the inability of a commanding officer to live up 
to the commitment he or she accepted by signing the Charge of Command? The 
Navy has often removed faltering leaders from authority but has not pursued 
financial compensation for the time, training, and trust invested in them�
It is time to debate the question� The Navy should create a postcommand 
screening board, charged with reviewing the details of individual firings� This 
board would be independent of the relieved individual’s chain of command and 
unrelated to any pending action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice re-
sulting from misconduct� This board should have the power to recoup bonuses 
from or impose other financial penalties on those who have made poor personal 
decisions while in command� This does not mean that every failed commanding 
officer would or should owe a financial debt to the Navy� For a purely professional 
failure, the balance might be restored by removal of the individual from the com-
mand; an objective review by this panel might find no further action necessary� 
But a personal failure, specifically misconduct, can be viewed as a breach of 
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contract, an inability of the individual to abide by the Charge of Command� Many 
commanding officer positions are designated as meriting additional pay or bo-
nuses; the financial penalty could be simply requiring the failed commander to re-
turn them�58 Bonuses received in command (e�g�, training or specialty bonuses or 
flight, sea, nuclear, medical specialty, command-responsibility, or other critical- 
skills pay) could be considered insurance against poor decisions—refundable 
security deposits by the Navy� Each firing would have to be reviewed individu-
ally, as each commanding officer represents a different level of investment by 
the Navy in getting him or her to and through command� And just as the Navy 
holds a midshipman responsible for failing to complete the course of instruction 
leading to commission, so should the Navy hold responsible its commanding of-
ficers who fail to complete their command tours� For the more than 99 percent of 
commanding officers who live within the Charge of Command and successfully 
complete their command tours the hazard is nonexistent� Individuals considering 
accepting the risk of misconduct may find in financial penalties the necessary 
motivation to choose better—motivation that previous initiatives have not sup-
plied� And even by preventing one firing, this option would take the Navy a step 
closer to eliminating misconduct among commanding officers�
Since publication of “The Navy’s Moral Compass” the Navy has made progress 
to reduce commanding officer misconduct� Progress has been achieved not only 
by implementing new initiatives but also by ensuring that previously established 
guidelines are properly executed, resulting in a solid basis for further reducing 
commanding officer firings for misconduct in the future� Holding commanding 
officers to a consistent and higher standard is necessary if they are to achieve 
long-term success in the position, and until the number of misconduct cases is 
zero, the pressure must be sustained� The Navy must continue to strive for a high 
standard, improve transparency regarding its standards, continuously review 
data trends, and scrutinize those entrusted with command� And it must improve 
the process that identifies and tracks allegations when they arise—and then hold 
individuals accountable�
N O T E S
 1� “NAS Whidbey Squadron Commander 
Relieved of Duty after Alleged Drunk Driving 
Incident,” Whidbey News-Times, 12 April 
2011� Epigraph quoted in William H� McMi-
chael, “Leadership Memo Cites San Antonio 
Fatality,” Navy Times, 27 March 2011�
 2� Tony Lombardo, “Amphib CO Fired, Source 
Says Linked to Alleged Bribery Scheme,” 
Navy Times, 2 October 2013�
 3� Karen Florin and Jennifer McDermott, “Sub 
Commander Relieved of Duty after Woman 
Book 1.indb   112 2/4/15   10:24 AM
13
Vogt: Revisiting the Navy’s Moral Compass: Has Commanding Officer Condu
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 VO G T  1 1 3
Alleges He Faked Death to End Affair,” The 
Day: Connecticut, 13 August 2012, theday 
.com/.
 4. Craig Whitlock, “Navy Investigates ex–Blue 
Angels Commander after Complaint He Al-
lowed Sexual Harassment,” Washington Post, 
23 April 2014.
 5. Jeanette Steele, “Report: Navy Skipper Abdi-
cated Command,” San Diego Union-Tribune, 6 
August 2014.
 6. Mark F. Light, “The Navy’s Moral Com-
pass: Commanding Officers and Personal 
Misconduct,” Naval War College Review 65, 
no. 3 (Summer 2012), pp. 136–52. Originally 
published as The Navy’s Moral Compass: Com-
manding Officers and Personal Misconduct, 
Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, 
Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 26 March 2010).
 7. U.S. Navy Dept., “MILPERSMAN 1301-800 
CH-40: Command Policies and Procedures—
Overview,” in Military Personnel Manual 
(Washington, D.C.: 30 June 2012).
 8. Vice Adm. Thomas Copeman, Commander, 
Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “Final 
Endorsement on Command Investigation 
into Ship’s Readiness and Leadership ICO 
USS COWPENS (CG 63)” [redacted], San 
Diego, Calif., 11 July 2014.
 9. Light, “Navy’s Moral Compass.”
 10. Ibid.
 11. See U.S. Army Dept., The United States Army 
Operating Concept, 2016–2028, TRADOC 
Pam 525-3-1 (Fort Monroe, Va.: Training 
and Doctrine Command, 19 August 2010), 
available at www.tradoc.army.mil/, and idem, 
Army: Profession of Arms—the Profession after 
10 Years of Persistent Conflict (West Point, 
N.Y.: Center for the Army Profession and 
Ethic, October 2010), available at cape.army 
.mil/. 
 12. Light, “Navy’s Moral Compass.”
 13. U.S. Navy Dept., Commanding Officer Detach 
for Cause Study 2010 (Washington, D.C.: 
Navy Inspector General) [hereafter Naval IG 
2010], executive summary.
 14. Ibid. For the purposes of Naval IG 2010, “Per-
sonal Misconduct” included five subcatego-
ries: “Orders Violations,” “Computer Pornog-
raphy,” “Falsifying Documents,” “Adultery/
Inappropriate Relationships/Harassment/
  Sexual Assault,” and “Alcohol/DUI [driving 
under the influence of alcohol]” (executive 
summary).
 15. Ibid., p. 15. For the biblical Bathsheba refer-
ence, see 2 Samuel 11–12. See also Dean C. 
Ludwig and Clinton O. Longenecker, “The 
Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of 
Successful Leaders,” Journal of Business Ethics 
12, no. 4 (April 1993).
 16. Naval IG 2010, p. 20.
 17. Ibid., pp. 20–21.
 18. McMichael, “Leadership Memo Cites San 
Antonio Fatality”; Adm. J. C. Harvey, Jr., “USS 
PONCE (LPD 15) CO/XO Relief,” Archived 
U.S. Fleet Forces Command Blog (2009–2012), 
26 April 2011, usfleetforces.blogspot.com/.
 19. Adm. G. Roughead, Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, “The Charge of Command,” Memo-
randum for All Prospective Commanding 
Officers, 5370 ser. N00/100050, 9 June 2011, 
Washington, D.C., available at www.public 
.navy.mil/. See also Sam Fellman, “CNO 
Underlines Command Conduct Standards,” 
Navy Times, 18 July 2011.
 20. “All commanding officers and others in 
authority in the naval service are required to 
show in themselves a good example of virtue, 
honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be 
vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all per-
sons who are placed under their command; to 
guard against and suppress all dissolute and 
immoral practices, and to correct, according 
to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all 
persons who are guilty of them; and to take 
all necessary and proper measures, under the 
laws, regulations, and customs of the naval 
service, to promote and safeguard the morale, 
the physical well-being, and the general wel-
fare of the officers and enlisted persons under 
their command or charge.” Requirement of 
Exemplary Conduct, 10 USC 5947.
 21. Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert, Chief of Naval 
Operations, “The Charge of Command,” 
Memorandum for All Prospective Com-
manding Officers, 5370 ser. N00/100107, 8 
November 2011, Washington, D.C., available 
at www.public.navy.mil/. 
 22. U.S. Navy Dept., “Command Qualification 
Program,” OPNAVINST 1412.14, Washing-
ton, D.C., 4 June 2012.
 23. Ibid., p. 2.
6809_Vogt.indd   113 2/11/15   8:50 AM
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/7
 1 1 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 24� Adm� Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Op-
erations, Statement before the House Armed 
Services Committee on FY 2015 Department of 
the Navy Posture, 113th Cong�, 2nd sess�, 12 
March 2014, p� 30�
 25� “New Center Imparts Ethical Command 
Leader Development,” NNS140506-13, 
America’s Navy, 6 May 2014, www�navy�mil/� 
 26� Ibid� For the Navy’s core values and ethos, see 
America’s Navy, www�navy�mil�
 27� “New Center Imparts Ethical Command 
Leader Development�”
 28� U�S� Navy Dept�, “Navy Equal Opportunity 
Policy,” OPNAVINST 5354�1F CH-1, Wash-
ington, D�C�, 20 September 2011�
 29� Ibid�, pp� 7–10�
 30� Naval IG 2010� 
 31� “Questions and Answers Concerning 
DEOMI’s Website and DEOCS Communica-
tions Outage,” U.S. Navy, n�d�, www�public 
�navy�mil/� 
 32� U�S� Navy Dept�, Navy Personnel Command, 
“Guidance on Command Climate Assess-
ments,” NAVADMIN 336/13, Washington, 
D�C�, 30 December 2013, available at www 
�public�navy�mil/� 
 33� Aaron Bresnahan, “The Charge of Com-
mand,” AUSN: Association of the United States 
Navy, 1 September 2011, www�ausn�org/� 
 34� Commander Salamander, “Skipper, Come 
Sign Your Page 13,” Cdr Salamander (blog), 
20 July 2011, cdrsalamander�blogspot�com/�
 35� SailorBob 2.0: The Real SWO Gouge, www 
�sailorbob�com�
 36� There are several Internet locations where 
the Navy community has created opportuni-
ties online to discuss events or post opinions� 
Examples include SailorBob 2.0: The Real SWO 
Gouge, www�sailorbob�com; Information Dis-
semination, www�informationdissemination 
�net; Cdr Salamander, cdrsalamander�blogspot 
�com; I Like the Cut of His Jib!!, navycaptain 
-therealnavy�blogspot�com; and The Stupid 
Shall Be Punished, bubbleheads�blogspot�com�
 37� As explained in “The Navy’s Moral Compass,” 
detachments for cause are administrative ac-
tions that release funding to move personnel 
subsequent to the removal for cause of naval 
officers from their current duty assignments; 
DFCs may not be required if suitable officers 
are immediately available to relieve the of-
ficers who have been fired, and such instances 
may not be documented� See U�S� Navy Dept�, 
“MILPERSMAN 1611-020 CH-18: Officer 
Detachment for Cause,” in Military Personnel 
Manual (Washington, D�C�: 30 March 2007), 
sec� 1� 
 38� “Commanding Officer, XO and Senior En-
listed Firings,” Navy Times, 5 February 2013� 
 39� “2010 Navy Commanding Officer Firings,” 
Navy Times, 15 December 2010�
 40� Naval IG 2010� 
 41� Light, “Navy’s Moral Compass�”
 42� Naval IG 2010�
 43� “Owners and Operators,” All Hands: For 
Sailors by Sailors, [2014], www�navy�mil/�
 44� Janis Reid, “NAS Whidbey Squadron Com-
manding Officer Fired for Racism, Other 
Misdeeds,” Whidbey News-Times, 13 January 
2014; “Whidbey Commander Relieved,” 
Whidbey News-Times, 28 February 2012; Sam 
Fellman, “Report: Fling in Italy Sank Flagship 
CO’s Career,” Navy Times, 13 January 2014; 
“NAS Whidbey Squadron Commander Re-
lieved of Duty”; “Growler Squadron CO Fired 
on Deployment,” Navy Times, 19 July 2011� 
 45� Whitlock, “Navy Investigates ex–Blue Angels 
Commander”; Meghann Myers, “Report: Blue 
Angels Boss Tolerated Porn, Lewdness,” Navy 
Times, 3 June 2014�
 46� Meghann Myers, “Blue Angels Report Calls 
Out Fighter Pilot Culture,” Navy Times, 25 
June 2014�
 47� Mark Faram and Meghann Myers, “Blue 
Angels Add XO, Screening after Misconduct 
Report,” Navy Times, 22 July 2014�
 48� Naval IG 2010�
 49� Ibid�, p� 16�
 50� Craig Whitlock, “Navy Has Spike in  
Commanding-Officer Firings,” Washington 
Post, 17 June 2011; U�S� Navy Dept�, Com-
manding Officer Detach for Cause Study 2004 
(Washington, D�C�: Navy Inspector General, 
15 November 2004), executive summary; 
Light, “Navy’s Moral Compass�”
 51� Changes of command may occur before 
the incumbent’s projected rotation date 
for such reasons as changing operational 
Book 1.indb   114 2/4/15   10:24 AM
15
Vogt: Revisiting the Navy’s Moral Compass: Has Commanding Officer Condu
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 VO G T  1 1 5
commitments or to accommodate an officer’s 
career requirements and improve promotion 
eligibility� Such events should be well docu-
mented by the ISIC�
 52� Naval IG 2010, p� 19�
 53� Ibid�
 54� “Navy Personnel Command, Human Re-
sources Officer Homepage,” U.S. Navy, www 
�public�navy�mil/�
 55� Whitlock, “Navy Has Spike in Commanding-
Officer Firings�” 
 56� Copeman, “Final Endorsement on Command 
Investigation � � � ICO USS COWPENS (CG 
63)”; Adm� Harry B� Harris, Jr�, Commander, 
U�S� Pacific Fleet, “Final Endorsement on 
Command Investigation into the Facts and 
Circumstances Surrounding Possible Viola-
tions of the Department of the Navy Policies 
on Equal Opportunity and Sexual Harass-
ment by the Former Commanding Officer 
of the U�S� Navy Flight Demonstration 
Squadron between July 2010 and November 
2012” [redacted], Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 16 
May 2014� 
 57� Tony Spiker, “Naval Academy Class of 2015 
Commits to Five Years of Military Service,” 
NNS130829-02, America’s Navy, 29 August 
2013, www�navy�mil/� 
 58� U�S� Navy Dept�, “MILPERSMAN 7220-100 
CH-25: Command Responsibility Pay,” Mili-
tary Personnel Manual (Washington, D�C�: 2 
December 2008)�
Book 1.indb   115 2/4/15   10:24 AM
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/7
